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Article 3

ARE SMALL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES MERELY
NOMINAL?*
The usual case in which nominal damages are awarded is
one wherein there is a mere invasion of a legal right, with no
actual damage, or wherein there is an invasion of a legal
right, with no proof as to the amount of the actual damage.
In some instances, very small compensatory damages, assessed for the invasion of a legal right, with inappreciable,
slight, trifling, or comparatively small actual damage, have
been judicially called nominal damages, or have been treated
as if they were only nominal damages. It is this doubtful
zone of very small damages that this article attempts to
treat.
The question squarely arises whether very small damages
and nominal damages are the same thing, in two types of
cases: first, cases in which the question is raised whether the
damages awarded for actual damage are sufficient to constitute a basis for the assessment of exemplary damages, in
jurisdictions where exemplary damages cannot be assessed
without first showing actual damage in which true compensatory damages are grounded; and, second, cases wherein
the appellate court finds it necessary to determine whether
the damages that should have been assessed and were not
assessed below were merely nominal, so as not to give the
plaintiff a right to have the judgment reversed, or were compensatory and therefore representative of actual damage, so
as to give him a right to a reversal in order that compensatory damages may be assessed.
Damages judically denominated "nominal" have been
awarded in the following classes of cases: first, vbhere there
*This article is a revision of an article that was published in 51 Ai. LAW
REv. 37 (Now the United States Law Review). It is reprinted with the permission
of the author and the United States Law Review.
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is a mere invasion of a legal right, with no actual damage;
second, where there is an invasion of a legal right, with trifling, slight,, or even comparatively small actual damage;
and third, where there is an invasion of a legal right, with
no proof as to the amount of the actual damage. Cases of
the third class naturally fall into two divisions: namely,
those where proof of the measure of damages is, from the
nature of the case, impossible; 3 and those wherein proof of
the measure of damages is possible but has not been made
on the trial.4
The second of the above classes includes the cases in which
courts often call the damages "nominal" merely because they
are very small, although there has been, in a few cases, a
sincere attempt to adhere to the strictly logical distinction
between small compensatory and merely nominal damages.
In Cady v. Fairckild5 the plaintiff, lessee for one year,
removed from the leased apartment before the end of the
1 Cady v. Fairchild, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 129 (1820).
"The term 'nominal damages,' like 'exemplary damages,' is purely relative,
and carries with it no suggestion of certainty as to amount. This is shown by
the definition given the expression in the recognized authorities. In 2 Bouv.
Law Dict. 504, it is defined as 'a trifling sum awarded where a breach of duty
or an infraction of the plaintiff's right is shown, but no serious loss is proved
to have been sustained.' 'Nominal damages' have also been described as 'a trivial
sum awarded where a mere breach of duty or infraction of right is shown, with
no serious loss sustained.' And. Law Dict. 307. It is apparent that this 'trivial
sum' might, according to the circumstances of each particlar case, vary almost
indefinitely. In some cases, a very small amount might constitute the trivial sum
contemplated by the term 'nominal damages'; in others, a much larger amount
might measure down to the same standard of triviality. It would depend largely
upon the vastness of the amount involved what sum would be considered trivial."
Sellers v. Mann, 113 Ga. 643, 39 S. E. 11, 12 (1901) (Quoted and followed in
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Glenn, 8 Ga. App. 168, 68 S. E. 881 (1919)).
Probably many would question whether "a trivial sum" could thus "vary almost
indefinitely."
2 White v. Stanbro, 73 IlI. 575 (1874); Gordon v. McLearn, 123 Ark. 496,
185 S. W. 803, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 482 (1916); Bartolini v. Grays Harbor Ry. &
Light Co., 88 Wash. 341, 153 Pac. 4 (1915); Southern Ry. Co. v. Cartledge, 73
S. E. 703 (Ga. App. 1912).
3 Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S. W. 1095, 37
L. R. A. (N. S.) 533 (1911), using the expression, "nominal actual damages."
Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1703).
4 Peek v.'Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 51 Mont. 295, 152 Pac. 421 (1915);
State ex rel. Lowery v. Davis, 117 Ind. 307, 20 N. E. 159 (1889).
5 Op. cit. supra note 1.
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term, leaving in the apartment a few articles of little value.
Defendants put these articles out of the house, left them
out for a few days, and then put them back, without their
receiving any material injury. Verdict and judgment in the
court below were erroneously given for the defendants; but
the upper court said:
"This is strictly a verdict contrary to evidence; but as no more
,than nominal damages ought to have been given, no material injustice has been done; and we .ought to apply the rule which has been
settled in regard to new trials. In Burton v. Thompson 6 Lord Mansfield said, 'It does not follow, by necessary consequence, that there
must be a new trial granted in all cases whatsoever, where the verdict
is contrary to the evidence;' as, 'where there is no real damage, and
where the injury is so trivial as not to deserve above half a crown
compensation;' and a new trial was denied in that case, though it was
admitted that the verdict was directly contrary to evidence."

The principal case here is typical, in that it treats the mere
invasion of a legal right, with no actual damage, as forming
a basis for nominal damages only; and Lord Mansfield, in
the case herein quoted, goes a step farther, treating trivial
damage as a ground for no more than nominal damages.
White v. Stanbro ' affords an instance in which it seems
uncertain whether any actual damage was suffered, and in
which, if there was such damage, it was trifling. The opinion, written by the early Illinois justice, Sidney Breese, does
not undertake to discriminate between nominal damages and
compensatory damages for a trifling injury. It seems that
trifling or very small actual damage, even if it had been
clearly proved in this case (which it apparently was not),
would have made no different result from that which is had
where no actual damage is proved at all; for the court, it
seems, would have been unwilling to concern itself with
trifling or even very small damage. The defendant had
erected a mill, which backed up water upon the land of the
plaintiff. Mr. Justice Breese said, in part:
6 2 Burr. 664, 97 Eng. Rep. 500 (1758).
7 Op. dt. supra note 2.
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"If the fact was clearly established the dam did flow back the
water onto appellant's land, the next question raised would be, was
appellant injured thereby, and to what extent? On this point we are
convinced that, at most, appellant could have recovered only nominal damages. The fact is well established that his land on the north
side of the river was always low, boggy and wet land, and not more
so since the dam was built. It is also shown that appellant has subjected it to pasture, and by large droves of cattle, which, long continued on such land as his is shown to be, will denude it of herbage
and destroy the sod. It is a kind of river bottom, low and marshy,
and overflowed by the usual spring freshets. Some witnesses say the
land is dryer now than it was before the dam was built.... The truth
is, this appears to be a very small case, in which, if damages could be
recovered at all, they would be so trifling and inconsiderable as to
forbid a court to waste time in considering the various objectionsstated."

In Gordon v. McLearn 8 the court speaks of "the comparatively nominal sum allowed as compensatory damages."
"Nominal," as here used, seems to mean "small"; but it is
to be noticed that it is not coupled directly with the word
"damages"; still the whole expression used, together with
the context in the case, naturally raises the query whether
the court did not mean the same as if it had ventured to
say, "only comparatively nominal damages were allowed."
Although there is logical objection to treating small compensatory and mere nominal damages as being the same thing,
the court would have been supported by some case authorities in treating the two kinds of damages substantially alike,
if the question had been squarely before it, which it was not.
An interesting case is Bartolini v. Grays Harbor Ry. &
Light Co.,9 in which small actual damage was treated as if
it did not exist and was made the basis of a right to nominal
damages only. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, started to
board defendant's street car with transfers. The wife was
ahead, and, as her husband was about to follow her, the
conductor refused to let him ride, calling him a "Dago," if
plaintiff's testimony was true. The wife followed her husOp. cit. supra note 2.
9 Op. cit. supra note 2.

8
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band off the car, and was caused almost to fall. The husband suffered no physical injury, the wife left the car voluntarily, no mental anguish was shown, and there was no
pecuniary loss, except a portion of the small street car fare.
The court said:
"cThere was, in fact, simply a naked violation of a legal right,
which would entitle respondents [plaintiffs below] to nothing more
than nominal damages."

The difference between the actual damage here inflicted and
no damage at all seems to have been regarded as too small
for the court to notice and therefore too small to lift proper
compensation from the category of mere nominal damages
to that of compensatory damages; and so the court goes
even so far as to say that there was "simply a naked violation of a legal right."
Another case in which small actual damage is treated as
ground for merely nominal damages is Southern Railway
Co. v. Cartledge,"° in the decision of which the court makes
the following remarks:
"The defendant, having carried the plaintiff beyond the point of
his destination, was liable to him in damages. [The court then proceeds to hold that, there being only negligence, with no aggravating
circumstances, punitive damages could not be assessed.] The case
was one for nominal damages only."

Small compensatory damages are, however, not always
treated as a kind of nominal damages. In Chapin v. Babcock " the Connecticut court said:
"It is urged that a new trial ought not to be granted, because the
damages will be small. Small damages, however, and nominal damages do not mean the same thing. Where there is a real right involved, the damages, even if very small, are substantial, and not nominal. To deprive a party of these, by refusing him a new trial because they must be small, would be to do him a great injustice."
10 OP. cit. supra note 2.

11 67 Conn. 258, 34 Atl. 1039 (1896).
"Nominal damages and small damages are not the same thing. Where a legal
right has been invaded and real injury done, the damages, though small, are
actual rather than nominal." Moore v. Duke, 84 Vt. 401, 408, 80 Atl. 194 (1911).
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What the exact or the approximate amount of damages
would be in this particular case, the report does not say,
so that we do not know whether the amount involved was
actually trivial; but the opinion refers to an earlier Connecticut case, Michael v. Curtis,1 2 in support of the rule
quoted above. In the latter case, the extent of the liability
was the reasonable value of the occupation of certain realty.
"The plaintiff claimed more than $500. The testimony offered by the defendant made it not more than $30 or $40.
Whatever it was, the plaintiff was entitled to recover....
It is said that a new trial ought not to be granted to enable
a party to recover nominal damages. This will not be denied.
Small damages and nominal damages, however, do not mean
the same thing. Nominal damages mean no damages. They
exist only in name and not in amount. But where there is a
real, legal right involved in a case, the damages, even if very
small, are substantial damages, and not nominal." As this
holding in Michael v. Curtis is in regard to damages in at
least the amount of thirty dollars, and not in regard to a
truly trifling amount, we can only conjecture whether the
same court would have taken the view that damages in the
amount of only six cents could ever, if awarded in compensation for damage, be considered as more than merely nominal, so as to give the plaintiff a right to ask a reversal of
judgment for the defendant. Besides, the court says that a
real, legal right is involved. Therefore, it seems uncertain
that the same court would have said that the right to an assessment of damages in the sum of six cents, in order to compensate the plaintiff for a very small actual damage and to
vindicate a small and unimportant legal right, was a right
to an assessment of compensatory damages-such a right as
the plaintiff would be permitted to vindicate by obtaining a
reversal and new trial. Maybe the same court would have
said in such a case, "De minimis non curat lex." Yet, the
year before, the Connecticut court had stated the same rule
12

60 Conn. 363, 22 At. 949 (1891).
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in another case; so that the logical distinction between nominal damages and small compensatory damages seems to be
so safely implanted in the law of that state that it would
probably be observed there in any event.
Another case noting the difference between these two
kinds of damages is Tri-State Telegraph & Telephone Co.
v. Cosgriff,' in which it is held that the damage sustained
by the owner of lands abutting on a public highway by the
taking of a strip immediately adjoining his property line,
for the purpose of constructing thereon a telephone and
telegraph line, while it may be small in amount, is not, as
a matter of law, merely nominal. In that case, with apparently good reason, the court says:
"Neither are we disposed to hold that the right of the owner of
property to compensation under such conditions is merely nominal. The
damage to the owner, in view of the existing servitude and the fur-

ther use to which the telephone company may wish to subject it,
may be small even to insignificance; but it is nevertheless substantial in the sense that he is entitled to recover a sum sufficient to duly

compensate him for all the damage actually sustained under the conditions."

Where there is no appreciable actual damage, as in Cady

v. Faircild,4 it is clear that the maxim, "De minimis non
curat lex," may reasonably be held to apply; because the
difference between no damage and the actual damage or

between nominal damages and the compensatory damages
in the case, is so small that it cannot be said to be reasonable to require that judicial 'cognizance shall be taken of it.
Where the 'damage is trifling, as in Burton v. Thompson 15
and White v. Stanbro,8 the same maxim may reasonably
be said to apply. But, where the damage is small, it is not
always trivial. On the facts in Bartolini v. Grays Harbor
1
19 N. Dak. 771, 124 N. W. 75, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171 (1909). See, also,
Stanton v. New York & F. Ry. Co., 59 Conn. 272, 22 AtI. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep.
110 (1890).
14
Op. dt. supra note 1.
15 Op. dt. supra note 6.
16 Op. cit. supra note 2.
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Ry. & Light Co. 17 and in Southern Railway Co. v. Cart-

ledge, 8 it would seem that the damage, although small,
might well have been classified as substantial. It would
seem that, in any event, damage more than trifling should
be the basis, not of nominal but of compensatory damages. 9
The distinction stated in the Connecticut cases above
mentioned seems logical, and the reasoning in Michael v.
Curtis seems particularly clear and really indisputable.
The difference between nominal and compensatory damages is so fundamental that it should never be overlooked.
In the cases in which the distinction has been ignored, it
seems hardly certain that the particular result reached in
any instance has been satisfactory; and it seems very doubtful whether any such decision, even if seemingly just in the
particular case being decided, ever constitutes the basis of a
rule that ought to be applied arbitrarily in the adjudication
of future cases. All damages assessed to repay the plaintiff
for a loss that is more than trivial, are, properly speaking,
compensatory. But, as to nominal damages, in the language
of the Connecticut court, as above quoted, "Nominal damages mean no damages. They exist only in name and not
in fact." The distinction is real and logical. It would seem
that the effect of its observance could not be other than reasonable and just.
Ralph S. Bauer.
De Paul University.
Op. cit. supra note 2.
Op. cit. supra note 2.
19 ". . . if the amount of the injury be trifling, or in many cases even if
no injury can be shown, the plaintiff is still entitled to what are called nominal
damages.. ." SEDGWICx, ELEMENTS Or THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2nd ed.) 81.
"Nominal "damages-A trifling sum awarded where a breach of duty or an
infraction of the plaintiff's right is shown, but no serious loss is proved to have
been sustained." BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONAARY (Rawle's 3rd Rev.).
"Nominal damages, in fact, mean a sum of money that may be spoken of, but
that has no existence in point of quantity. . ." Maule, J., in Beaumont v. Greathead, 2 C. B. 494, 499, 135 Eng. Rep. 1039, 1041 (1846) (Quoted in Wooo's
MAYNE ON DAMAGES 6).
17
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